Strictly speaking, the works did not constitute a new legal code.
As far as lawyers are concerned, perhaps the reason is that they are in some way forced to speak on the basis of their professional knowledge and therefore in terms of contemporary systems of law.
Political scientists, on Justinian and his codification of roman other hand, often appear to be inclined to think of politics as a sort of technique, comparable, say, to engineering, which involves the idea that people should be dealt with by political scientists approximately in the same way as machines or factories are dealt with by engineers.
The engineering idea of political science has, in fact, little, if anything, in common with the cause of individual freedom. Of course, this is not the only way to conceive of political science as a technique.
Political science can also be considered although this happens less and less frequently today as a means of enabling people to behave as much as possible as they like, instead of behaving in the ways deemed suitable by certain technocrats.
Knowledge of the law, in its turn, may be viewed in a perspective other than that of the lawyer who must speak as if he were bound whenever he has to defend a case in court. If he is sufficiently well versed in the law, a lawyer knows very well how the legal system of his country works and also sometimes how it does Edition: Moreover, if he has some historical knowledge, he may easily compare different ways in which successive legal systems have worked within the same country.
Finally, if he has some knowledge of the way in which other legal systems work or have worked in other countries, he can make many valuable comparisons that usually lie beyond the horizon of both the economist and the political scientist.
In fact, freedom is not only an economic or a political concept, but also, and probably above all, a legal concept, as it necessarily involves a whole complex of legal consequences. While the political approach, in the sense I have tried to outline above, is complementary to the economic one in any attempt to redefine freedom, the legal approach is complementary to both.
However, there is still something lacking if this attempt is to succeed. During the course of the centuries many definitions of freedom have been given, some of which could be considered incompatible with others.
The result is that a univocal sense could be given to the word only with some reservation and after previous enquiries of a linguistic nature. Everyone can define what he thinks freedom to be, but as soon as he wants us to accept his formulation as our own, he has to produce some truly convincing argument.
However, this problem is not peculiar to statements about freedom; it is one that is connected with every kind of definition, and it is, I think, an undoubted merit of the contemporary analytical school of philosophy to have pointed out the importance of the problem.
A philosophical approach must therefore be combined with the economic, the political, and the legal approaches in order to analyze freedom. This is not in itself an easy combination to achieve. Further difficulties are connected with the peculiar nature of the social sciences and with the fact that their data are not so univocally ascertainable as those of the so-called natural sciences.
In spite of this, in analyzing freedom, I have tried, as far as possible, to consider it first as a datum, namely, a psychological attitude. I have done the same with constraint, which is, in a sense, the opposite of freedom, but which is also a psychological attitude on the part of both those who try to do the constraining and those who feel that they are being constrained.
This means that people belonging to a political system in which freedom is defended and preserved for each and all against constraint cannot help being constrained at least to the extent that their own interpretation of freedom, and consequently also of constraint, does not coincide with the interpretation prevailing in that system.
However, it seems reasonable to think that these interpretations on the part of people generally do not differ so much as to foredoom to failure any attempt to arrive at a theory of political freedom.
It is permissible to assume that at least within the same society the people who try to constrain others and those who try to avoid being constrained by others have approximately the same idea of what constraint is. It can therefore be inferred that they have approximately the same idea of what the absence of constraint is, and this is a very important assumption for a theory of freedom envisaged as the absence of constraint, such as is suggested in this book.
To avoid misunderstandings, it must be added that a theory of freedom as the absence of constraint, paradoxical as it may appear, does not preach absence of constraint in all cases. There are cases in which people have to be constrained if one wants to preserve the freedom of other people.
This is only too obvious when people have to be protected against murderers or robbers, although it is not so obvious when this protection relates to constraints and, concomitantly, freedoms that are not so easy to define.
However, a dispassionate study of what is going on in contemporary society not only reveals that constraint is inextricably intertwined with freedom in the very attempt to protect the latter, but also, unfortunately, that according to several doctrines, the more one increases constraint, the more one increases freedom.The codification of Justinian has served as a primary source for studies of Roman law and Roman legal literature and was the basis of the Roman law adopted in feudal Europe.
REFERENCES Pereterskii, I.
S. Digesty Iustiniana. Canon law is the body of laws and regulations made by or adopted by ecclesiastical authority, for the government of the Christian organization and its members.
The word adopted is here used to point out the fact that there are certain elements in canon law borrowed by the Church from civil law or. History remembers Emperor Justinian for his reorganization of the government of the Roman Empire and his codification of the laws, the Codex Justinianus, in A.D.
Justinian Family Data An Illyrian, Justinian was born Petrus Sabbatius in A.D. in Tauresium, Dardania (Yugoslavia), a Latin-speaking area of the Empire. Foreword to the Third Edition. B runo Leoni was a devoted proponent, in virtually all his activities, of those ideals we call liberal.
He was a remarkable talented, intelligent, able, persuasive, multifaceted individual who might well have deserved the description. Most Common Text: Click on the icon to return to benjaminpohle.com and to enjoy and benefit. the of and to a in that is was he for it with as his on be at by i this had not are but from or have an they which one you were all her she there would their we him been has when who will no more if out so up said what its about than into them can only other time new some could these two may first then do.
Early career. Justinian was a Latin-speaking Illyrian and was born of peasant stock.
Justinianus was a Roman name that he took from his uncle, the emperor Justin I, to whom he owed his benjaminpohle.com still a young man, he went to Constantinople, where his .